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PREFACE 
The development of the nuclear power programme has been 
accompanied by steady improvements in the design and operation of the 
equipment for processing radioactive effluents prior to discharge, al-
though these improvements have not always been accorded due publicity. 
Present generation designs lead to very low environmental exposure such 
that it is often below the limits of direct detection. This evolution is in 
keeping with the "as low as readily achievable" philosophy, recommended 
initially by the L C. R. P. and now widely accepted. It is the purpose of 
this report to attempt to quantify this evolution, with particular reference 
to tritium in power stations equipped with light water reactors, as it 
appears in the open literature. 
Collective dose (expressed in man-rem) is one method of 
quantifying the extent of environmental exposure; such a procedure is not 
universally accepted; the lack of sufficiently precise criteria may compli-
cate its application and interpretation. Nevertheless, it can on the whole 
give a reasonable measure of the relative significance of different dis-
charges, and it is widely used in the literature utilised in this study. 
Both in terms of length of experience and published informa-
tion, U. S. reactors form the most convenient field of study in the pre-
sent context, viz. the quantification of the evolution of environmental 
exposure and the optimization - as is inherent in the phrase "readily 
achievable" - of waste management. It is to be hoped that at some later 
date a comparable study based on European experience and situations will 
be possible. 
Dr. P. RECHT 
Director 
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1. SUMMARY 
This report presents the findings of a study of the relationship 
between occupational exposure and population exposure resulting from 
operational practices in light water reactor plants. 
A review is made of experience in LWR plants in the US. It is 
concluded that the level of occupational exposure to date has averaged about 
1400 man-rem per GW(e)-year of electricity generated. The main source of 
occupational exposure is activated corrosion products and between 60% and 
80% of exposure occurs during maintenance and refuelling outages. The 
contribution from the operation and maintenance of waste management systems 
is of the order of 10% of total exposure. Whilst, in some cases, augmentation 
of waste systems might marginally increase occupational exposure, in other 
cases improvements in the system might reduce exposure. 
A part from the global population dose from carbon-14 release, 
the main contribution to population exposure from early plants arose from 
noble gas releases from BWR plants. With the introduction of augmented 
waste systems, these have been greatly reduced and, again excepting C-14, 
the level of collective population exposure has been reduced far below the 
collective occupational exposure. 
A review is made of the radiological impact of plant water recycle 
in PWR plants. It is concluded that recycle can result in significant 
occupational exposure to tritium. In locations where rivers are an 
important source of drinking water, it seems possible that some small 
reduction in population exposure could result from recycle. 
In optimising the balance between occupational and population 
exposure, some form of cost-benefit analysis seems to be required. It is 
pointed out that occupational exposure at the levels experienced in LWR plants 
represents a direct cost to the utility. Expressed in dollars per man-rem , 
this cost is one to two orders of magnitude higher than the hypothetical 
1 health-cost 1 associated with population exposure. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
The operation of nuclear power plants results in the generation of 
large inventories of radioactivity. These comprise fission products and 
transuranic elements within the fuel, and smaller amounts of radio-
activation products arising from the interaction of neutrons with the coolant 
and structural materials of the reactor. Apart from relatively small 
amounts which leak from defective fuel cans, almost all of the fission products 
and the transuranic elements are retained within the fuel and are eventually 
transported to a fuel reprocessing plant. That portion of the radioactivity 
which leaks from fuel appears, along with a proportion of the activation 
products, in waste streams at the nuclear power plant. The release to the 
environment of some fraction of the radioactivity in these waste streams 
cannot be avoided and this leads to the exposure of the general population to 
ionising radiation. This aspect of nuclear operations has received a great 
deal of attention in recent years, and the effect has been a tightening up of 
limits for environmental releases and public exposure. 
In general, measures taken to reduce releases of radioactivity to 
the environment entail more sophisticated waste treatment systems and the 
accumulation of greater inventories of radioactivity in storage facilities. 
This is liable to increase both the amount of maintenance required on waste 
systems and the dose rates encountered. Consequently, any reduction in 
population exposure could be offset or even out-weighed by an increase in the 
exposure of plant personnel. In addition to work on the waste treatment 
system , increased occupational exposure could result from more frequent 
outages enforced by stringent release limits. 
The extent to which occupational exposure has been increased in 
practice by the augmented waste treatment systems in more recent nuclear 
power plants is somewhat uncertain. However, it is apparent that the level 
of occupational dose is a major operational problem at many plants. Thus 
any measures which might further increase the dose need to be evaluated 
very carefully. 
Another factor is that the view is being expressed in some quarters 
that occupational dose limits are too high. Many plants would be faced with 
severe problems if current limits were to be significantly reduced. 
In this report, attention has been confined to consideration of 
light-water reactors (LWR) since these are likely to dominate plant 
investment for the next decade or two. The data presented refer almost 
entirely to experience in the USA because only in that country is this type of 
information freely disseminated. It is the author's opinion that both the 
public and the nuclear industry would benefit from a similar approach in 
Europe. 
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It should be noted that the term 'exposure' is used in this report 
in the general sense of ' exposure to ionising radiation' , rather than in its 
special dosimetric sense. For brevity, 'dose' is used to mean dose-
equivalent. 
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3. RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION STANDARDS 
The authoritative international body concerned with radiological 
standards is the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 
The current recommendations are essentially those which were introduced in 
1959, though various minor modifications have been made. The 
recommendations were intended to limit somatic effects in individuals and 
hereditary effects in the population as a whole. Thus, in addition to 
permissible doses for individuals, limits were recommended for the average 
dose to whole populations. For individuals exposed in the course of their 
occupation, the annual dose limits are 5 rem to the gonads and bone marrow, 
30 rem to skin, bone and thyroid, 75 rem to extremities and 15 rem to other 
organs. The limits for individual members of the public are one-tenth of 
the occupational exposure values, except in the case of the thyroid, for which 
the limit is one-twentieth, that is 1. 5 rem/y. A provisional limit of 5 rem 
per generation (i.e. per 30 years) was recommended for the genetically 
significant dose in a whole population. The apportionrrent of this limit 
between various possible sources of exposure is left to national authorities. 
In all cases mentioned above, the permissible dose is in addition to that 
resulting from natural background radiation and medical procedures. 
These dose limits, which the Commission has repeatedly 
emphasised are maximum values, were re-affirmed in 1973. The Commission, 
recognising that any exposure may involve some degree of risk, recommended 
that unnecessary exposure be avoided and that all doses be kept as low as 
practicable (Ref. 1). This was later re-worded in ICRP Publication 9 
(Ref. 2) to read " ••••• and that all doses be kept as low as readily achievable, 
economic and social considerations being taken into account 11 • The inter-
pretation of these terms gave rise to some controversy and the Commission 
subsequently clarified its intentions in Publication 22 (Ref. 3). In this, the 
adverb 1 readily 1 is replaced by 1 reasonably 1 , and some guidance is given as 
to how to take account of social and economic considerations by the application 
of a methodology of differential cost-benefit analysis. 
The ICRP recommendations form the basis of national and 
international regulations such as the Euratom Directives relating to 
radiological protection standards. In addition, various types of derived 
standards are in use. These provide interpretation of the basic standards 
for specific applications and take account of special local considerations. 
An important example of such derived standards is the issue by 
the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission of Docket No. RM-50-2, "The opinion 
of the Commission on the Matter of Rulemaking Hearing - numerical guides 
for design objectives and limiting conditions for operation to meet the 
criterion 1 as low as practicable 1 for radioactive material in light-water-
cooled nuclear power reactor effluents". The design objectives, which are 
specified on a 1 per reactor 1 rather than a 1 per site 1 basis, require limitation 
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of releases of radioactivity so that the annual dose to any individual in 
unrestricted areas will not exceed 3 mrem to the total body or 10 mrem to 
any organ in the case of liquid effluents, and 5 m rem to the total body and 
15 mrem to the skin due to gaseous effluents. For particulates and radio-
iodines the individual organ limit is 15 mrem per year. There is also a 
requirement to install such further equipment as would be justified by a 
cost-benefit analysis. The benefit is defined as the reduction in the 
collective dose out to a distance of 50 miles, valued provisionally at $1000 
per man-rem and per man-thyroid rem. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
has replaced the phrase 1 as low as practicable 1 by the version used in 
ICRP 22, that is 1 as low as reasonably achievable 1 • 
Another example of derived standards is the issue by the Central 
Electricity Generating Board in the UK of 1 Radiological Design Criteria 1 
(Ref. 4). These criteria are intended to alleviate possible difficulties which 
could arise should existing dose limits be reduced in the future. Broadly, 
the criteria allow for a five-fold reduction in whole body dose limits, and 
for special consideration of dose from ingestion pathways or long-lived 
deposited activity. 
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4. OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE AT LWR PLANTS 
The level of occupational radiation exposure to plant maintenance 
staff-and contractors' personnel is posing an increasing and, in some cases, 
severe problem in LWR nuclear power plants. In order to obtain statistics to 
enable trends to be observed and major sources to be identified, more 
attention is being given in the US to the recording and reporting of exposure 
data. These data are reported in limited detail in plant semi-annual 
operating reports to which some reference has been made (e.g. Ref. 5). 
Reports have also been published in the US summarising exposure statistics 
and analysing the results in relation to such factors as type, age and size of 
plant, as well as attempting to identify the job activities contributing most to 
exposure (Ref. 6, 7 and 8). 
It is clear that the main contribution to in-plant exposure arises 
during maintenance of primary systems and comes from activated corrosion 
products, of which Co-60 is usually the most significant. 
An area of particular interest to the present study is the extent to 
which radioactive waste treatment (radwaste) systems contribute to 
occupational exposure. Data are reported relating to this topic (Ref. 9 and 
10). 
4.1 Factors influencing occupational exposure 
A summary of occupational radiation exposure in LWR plants in the 
US from 1969 to 1974 is shown in Table 1 (Ref. 8). The increase in the 
average annual man-rem dose per unit over the period can be partly 
explained by the increasing size of the later plants. This is illustrated by 
Table 2, in which the dose is normalised to electrical power generation. 
After normalising in this way, any trend is masked by the variability of the 
data. However, this apparent relationship between exposure and power 
generation is probably due to a combination of factors, some tending to 
increase, and others to decrease, the dose. 
An analysis of the factors which affect the level of occupational 
exposure in LWR plants was made in Ref. 7, which was prepared under the 
National Environmental Studies Project (NESP). The major findings, 
supplemented in some cases from other sources, are reviewed briefly 
below. 
Type of plant: The dependence of the level of occupational exposure on the 
type of plant is illustrated by the weighted average values in the bottom 
lines of Tables 1 and 2. The average dose per plant is about 40% higher in 
PWRs than in BWRs but, when normalised to power generation, the difference 
between the two types of plants is not significant, the average dose being 
about 1400 man-rem/GW(e)-year. It should, however, be noted that one PWR 
plant, Palisades, has been excluded from the analysis because of 
exceptionally unfavourable experience, see 4.3 below. 
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Age of plant: The importance of activated corrosion products as a 
contributor to occupational dose has already been mentioned. These arise 
as a result of the deposition in the core region of corrosion material which is 
then activated by the neutron flux. Coolant exchange and transport processes 
transfer some of the activity to the out-of-core regions of the primary 
system. In the early years of operation of a plant, the inventory of 
corrosion products in the system and on core surfaces is increasing and 
so the rates of production and release of activated material also increase. 
On this basis the dose rates around the plant due to activated corrosion 
products would be expected to be a supra-linear, perhaps a quadratic, 
function of time. By the time the equilibrium refuelling cycle is achieved, 
the rate of release from the core is constant, neglecting short-term transient 
behaviour. The buildup of the radiation levels then follows the form 
[1-exp(-A.t)], where A. is the decay constant of the principal contributor, 
which is usually cobalt-60 (half-life 5. 3 years). Thus there is a period of 
linear increase followed by a levelling off at 10 to 15 years. 
Although this is a somewhat simplified view, which does not take 
full account of crud bursting, crud flushing and plant cleanup mechanisms, 
the general form of behaviour is borne out by plant experience. This is 
illustrated in Fig. 1 in which the buildup of the dose rate in the vicinity of 
the primary system of a BWR plant is shown (Ref. 11). The increase of 
occupational exposure with time is not necessarily of the same form, since 
the maintenance requirements may change. However, the analysis performed 
in Ref. 7 suggested that, for LWRs as a whole, the occupational dose increased 
by a factor of two to three per year for the first few years and thereafter at 
about 12% per year. This seemed to be true both of the early plants and of the 
larger second-generation plants. 
The importance of plant age is also illustrated by Table 3 (Ref. 8) 
in which twenty-five stations are ranked in order of cumulative occupational 
dose per MW(e)-year. This shows a clear correlation with plant age and 
it can be seen that at only one plant aged 5 years or more is the normalised 
dose less than 1000 man-rem per GW(e)-year. 
Plant size: The influence of plant size on the level of occupational dose 
is partly concealed by the shorter operating times of the larger plants. The 
analysis in Ref. 7 showed that for BWRs, the annual exposure is considerably 
higher in the large plants than in the early small plants. When exposure is 
normalised to power generation the reverse is true. Very roughly, it 
appears that for a given age of plant, the annual occupational dose is 
proportional to the square root of plant size. 
The difference in size between the first and second generation PWR 
plants is much smaller than in the case of BWRs. The differences in dose are 
consequently smaller but are not inconsistent with a similar form of 
relationship to that mentioned above. 
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4. 2 Main sources of exposure 
A detailed analysis was made in the NESP report of data from LWR 
plants in order to estimate the contributions to exposure from various tasks. 
Considerable variation was found from plant to plant. Only 47% and 65% 
respectively of total exposure in BWR and PWR plants was accounted for in 
detail; most of the remainder was attributed to routine operations and 
maintenance. An extremely detailed breakdown of exposure at the 1974 
refuelling at the H.B. Robinson PWR plant was recently reported (Ref. 12). 
Combining this with information from the semi-annual operating report from 
the same plant (Ref. 5), an overall breakdown of exposure similar to that in 
the NESP report can be obtained. It is worth noting that, at this plant in 1974, 
512 man-rem out of the annual total of 680 man-rem dose arose during the 
refuelling and maintenance outage. 
Table 4 summarises the breakdown of exposure by task for BWR and 
PWR from the NESP report and for the 19 7 4 data from the H. B. Robinson PWR 
plant as discussed above. It appears that, for both types of plant, about 60% 
to 80% of total exposure occurs during refuelling and maintenance outages. 
In PWRs, steam generator work is the main contributor, averaging about 25% 
of total exposure. Next in importance are pressure vessel head removal 
and installation work, in-service inspection and waste system operation and 
maintenance. At BWR plants, no single source of exposure is dominant. 
General primary system maintenance, waste system operation and 
maintenance and in-service inspection are the main sources of occupational 
exposure. 
An analysis of the recorded annual total-body exposures for 1974 
at the H.B. Robinson PWR plant is shown in Table 5 (derived from Ref. 5). 
This gives a breakdown of individual doses and indicates the main duties of 
those individuals receiving the bulk of the exposure. 
4. 3 Major eguipment failures 
The very high cumulative exposures at some of the plants listed in 
Table 3 are atypical in that they are attributable to major equipment failures. 
Several plants have experienced such failures and the occupational exposures 
involved in the repair operations have ranged from a few hundred to a few 
thousand man-rem. The health physics aspects of one of these operations, 
the repair of defective welds in boiler downcomers at Indian Point 1 PWR, 
have been reported in detail (Ref. 13). The repair, which utilised about 
1500 people, resulted in a total exposure of 3500 man-rem. 
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At another PWR plant, Palisades, severe problems with steam 
generators have resulted in very high occupational exposure. The dose 
statistics from this plant have been excluded from the analyses of Tables 1 
and 2 because they distort the overall picture to an unreasonable extent. 
However, it must be noted that the occasional major failure can involve 
exposure equivalent to several years of normal plant operation. The later 
in plant life that the failure occurs, the more severe will be the problem , 
because of the increasing radiation levels around the reactor systems. 
4. 4 Internal exposure 
Little has been published about occupational exposure resulting 
from the intake of radioactivity by plant personnel. The main possibilities 
for this mode of exposure would seem to be; 
a) inhalation of activation products during system maintenance 
with a resulting lung dose, 
b) inhalation of radio-iodines during containment access or, in 
BWRs, turbine-house work, and 
c) exposure to tritiated water vapour in PWRs. 
The occasional incident involving inhalation of activation products 
has been reported. For example, at the H.B. Robinson plant in 1974, a 
worker experienced an intake of Co-58 and Co-60 corresponding to a lung 
dose commitment of 16 rem (Ref. 5). 
Thyroid dose from inhalation of radio-iodines seems to have been 
very low but the trend towards recirculatory ventilation systems in BWR 
turbine-houses might result in some increase. 
Exposure to tritium does not appear to have been measured 
routinely. However, estimates have been made of the likely exposure, 
under various assumptions as to the extent of plant water recycling (Ref. 14 
and 15). This aspect is discussed in greater detail in Section 7. 
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5. OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE FROM RADWASTE TREATMENT 
The exposure resulting from the operation and maintenance of 
radwaste systems is of particular interest in the context of this report. The 
information presented in Section 4. 2 suggests that waste management is a 
significant but not a dominant source of exposure, ranging from about 6% to 
13% of total exposure. The data from the H .B. Robinson plant include only 
the contribution from work during the refuelling outage and it is thought that 
exposure during routine operation might increase the total contribution from 
waste management from 6. 4% to about 10%. 
The extent to which occupational dose is affected by the imposition 
of more stringent. release limits is somewhat uncertain. Apart from any 
direct effects arising from the operation and maintenance of the augmented 
waste systems, there is also the possibility of indirectly influencing exposure 
because of constra~nts on the operation of the plant as a whole. Examples of 
both these situatiori'P are discussed below. 
5.1 Direct exposure 
Increased waste treatment involves the processing and accumulation 
of larger inventories of radioactivity within the plant and could lead to higher 
occupational doses. However, in practice, this is true only to a very limited 
extent. For example, arisings of radioactivity in solid wastes, comprising 
mainly evaporator bottoms and spent resins, are typically of the order of 
500 Ci per year in an LWR plant. Discharges of radioactivity, other than 
tritium, in liquid effluents from first-generation plants have seldom 
exceeded 20 to 30 Ci per year. Thus, the introduction of augmented waste 
systems, which have reduced these discharges to about 1 Ci or less per year, 
can only have increased the accumulated activity by a few per cent. Whilst 
the volume of waste and the costs of its treatment, drumming and disposal 
have increased substantially, the associated dose is unlikely to have 
increased appreciably. 
Another example is the increased tritium activity within PWR plants 
when primary water is recycled. This is considered in greater detail 
in Section 7, in which it is concluded that significant exposure can arise as 
the concentration of tritium builds up. 
In the case of gaseous wastes, there is a significant increase in 
the holdup of radioactivity when augmented systems are used. However, 
with properly designed systems, there is no reason \\hy this should increase 
occupational exposure. 
The possibility must also be considered that more stringent release 
limits may reduce rather than increase occupational exposure. This could 
result from improvements in plant design in relation to such factors as 
leakage collection, plant layout and, more generally, increased reliability. 
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An appreciable proportion of the dose received from radwaste systems seems 
to be attributable to under-design or unreliability. For example, drumming 
stations are amenable to a greater degree of remote handling and automation 
than has been the practice in most plants. Evaporators, on the other hand, 
have often caused unnecessary exposure because of unreliability. 
5. 2 Indirect exposure 
In principle, the imposition of more stringent limits for the release 
of radioactivity in effluents can place additional constraints on the operation 
of a plant. This can lead to increased outage time and consequently to 
additional exposure. For example, there is a range of defective fuel 
incidence which is clearly tolerable, at least until a scheduled outage. 
Similarly there is a much higher range which is intolerable even for short 
periods and which necessitates immediate shutdown. Between these lies a 
grey area in which the decision as to whether or not operation can continue 
will depend on a number of factors including the actual and the permissible 
rates of effluent release. A parallel situation exists with coolant leakage, 
particularly steam generator tube leakage in PWRs, for which the tolerable 
level may be dictated by release limits. 
It has been argued (e.g. Ref. 10) that stricter limits must result 
in more frequent shutdowns and, consequently, in increased occupational 
exposure from head removal , fuel inspection and fuel handling , or from tube 
repairs. However, this seems to be an over-simplified argument, since the 
magnitudes of fuel defects or coolant leakages which are tolerable depend on, 
among other factors, the design margins of the radwaste system. In 
practice, the designs of augmented systems in recently commissioned plants 
in the US seem to have about the same margin on the current release 
criteria as did the designs of older plants on the original criteria. It might 
alternatively be argued that augmentation of waste systems provides greater 
operational flexibility. This might still lead to increased occupational 
exposure, since prolonged operation with severe fuel defects or high coolant 
leakage rates will inevitably worsen the work environment. 
Another factor which leads to reduced flexibility of operation is 
the unduly restrictive interpretation of limits. An example of this is the 
expression of limits intended as annual averages in terms of instantaneous 
dose rates or radionuclide concentrations. In some circumstances this can 
increase not only occupational dose but also public dose since it encourages 
a policy of deliberate discharge. 
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6. POPULATION EXPOSURE FROM LWR OPERATION 
Apart from releases of radioactivity, exposure of the public due to 
nuclear power plants can arise from direct gamma radiation from the plant 
or from radioactive materials in transit from the plant. In this report, 
attention is confined to the contribution of releases of radioactivity to 
population exposure, since in the other cases there is, in general, no conflict 
between the interests of occupational and population exposure. 
The doses received by individuals within the population, as a result 
of releases of radioactivity from nuclear installations, vary widely depending 
on their location, age, dietary and other habits, and other statistical factors. 
More generally this can be expressed in the terms that a given release of 
radioactivity results in a dose distribution in the population. The most highly 
exposed individuals, at the upper extremity of the dose distribution, form the 
so-called critical exposure group. The area under the distribution curve 
represents the total population dose which, under the linear dose-risk 
assumption, is a measure of the total detriment resulting from the release. 
Waste management operations have, in the past, been controlled 
mainly on the basis of critical group considerations. This provides a 
convenient and practicable method of setting discharge limits to ensure that 
no individual exceeds the dose limit. It does not take account of the possibly 
greater risk represented by the exposure of the population as a whole to 
relatively low doses. Nor does it permit the overall risk from radioactive 
releases to be minimised, since steps taken to reduce critical group dose 
could actually increase the total population dose. 
More recently, the collective dose to whole populations has been 
recognised as a possible criterion against which to judge the significance 
of releases. As with occupational exposure, it is often useful to normalise 
population dose to unit operation, such as 1 GW(e)-year of generation. 
In using the concept of population dose, the question as to how far 
the integration of dose should be extended is a controversial matter. In 
principle, it is possible to estimate the dose commitment from a given release 
integrated over the whole global population and over the whole period of 
existence of the radioactivity in the biosphere. A criticism which is often 
made of this method is that much of the dose arises from the exposure of 
large populations in regions remote from the point of release to dose rates 
which may be orders of magnitude below natural background. The alternative 
is to place finite limits on the integration and these may take the form of a 
threshold dose rate, a limiting distance from the point of release, or a limit 
in time after the release. However, in any of these cases, the selection of 
a limit involves an arbitrary and probably controversial decision. In addition, 
major inconsistencies arise when multiple or increasing sources of release 
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are considered. For example, if a threshold dose rate is applied, the 
contribution at a given point from a particular source of release may be 
below the threshold, but when added to the contribution from another source 
may exceed the threshold. Strictly, in applying a threshold, the contribution 
of every nuclide from every contributory source would need to be considered. 
6. 1 Assessment of population dose 
The magnitude and composition of routine releases of radioactivity 
from nuclear power plants depend on the plant performance, the modes of 
operation and the methods of treatment. The radiological impact of a given 
release depends on the mode of release, the site characteristics and the 
prevailing conditions. Usually, the levels of release of radioactivity from 
nuclear installations are so low that the dose to an individual cannot be 
obtained or inferred by environmental monitoring, except in the case of a 
member of the critical group. Reliance must instead be placed on idealised 
mathematical models. In the last few years a great deal of effort has been 
expended on the development of methods of estimating the exposure of local, 
regional and global populations. 
In the US, detailed computer programs have been developed to 
enable the assessment of radiation doses to individuals and to populations 
arising from the release of radioactivity from nuclear installations. Both 
the Directorate of Regulatory Standards of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) have used detailed models to compare the radiological impact 
of LWR plants with a range of waste treatment options (Ref. 16 and 17). 
For the purpose of this study, estimates of the population dose 
resulting from releases of radioactivity in liquid and gaseous effluents from 
LWR plants have been derived from the EPA work. Results are presented 
for two alternative waste treatment systems for each type of plant. These 
are a basic system, typical of systems in plants commissioned in the late 
1960s, and an augmented system, representing plants commissioned in the 
mid-1970s. In the former case, the EPA estimates have been adjusted 
where necessary to correspond more closely to actual release rates as 
reported in Ref. 18. However it is emphasised that considerable variation 
occurs from plant to' plant. 
Three generalised categories of site have been used in the 
assessments in the US, seacoast, river and lake. The differences between 
the three types of site from a dose assessment point of view arise from 
different population distributions, variations in meteorological characteristics 
and major differences in pathways of exposure to liquid releases. The 
integration of population dose has, in most cases, been confined to the 
population within 80 km of the plant. In some cases, particularly of releases 
to atmosphere, the total dose could have been underestimated. 
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6. 2 Population dose from PWR operation 
In the first generation PWR plants gas treatment is usually confined 
to holdup of primary system off-gases. For the basic system, 15 days 
holdup was selected. No special features to limit I-131 release to 
atmosphere were assumed. In the augmented treatment case, the gas 
holdup was increased to 30 days and the features provided t-
release were a re-circulatory containment cleanup system, '-'L~ 
building charcoal absorber and the venting of the blowdown to the wa1L 
condenser. 
Typical liquid effluent treatment in early PWR plants consists of 
evaporation of high- and low-purity wastes, filtration of laundry waste and 
the untreated discharge of steam generator blowdown. In the augmented 
system all waste streams are evaporated and demineralised and additional 
tank capacity enables a high recycle capacility. 
A summary of the estimates of population total-body and thyroid 
doses is shown in Table 6. It will be seen that, in all cases, the radiological 
impact is greatest for the generalised river site. The major contribution to 
total-body dose in the basic treatment case is from releases in liquid effluents. 
Significant contributions to thyroid dose arise from both liquid and atmospheric 
releases. The population dose from a PWR with augmented treatment systems 
is very low. 
It is noticeable that, in spite of the relatively high rates of tritium 
release in liquid effluents, the contribution of this nuclide to population dose 
is negligible. The EPA estimates of population dose from tritium release to 
rivers correspond to 6 x 10-4 man-rem per curie. It seems likely that the 
population dose from tritium release to most European rivers could be higher 
than for typical US rivers. Results reported in the UK suggest a figure of 
the order of 0. 1 man-rem per curie for releases of tritium into the Thames 
(Ref. 19). This is an extreme case since the Thames supplies a large 
proportion of the drinking water for the population of Greater London. The 
Rhine is probably more typical and it is estimated that the population dose 
commitment is of the order of 10-2 man-rem per curie of tritium released. 
Releases of tritium to atmosphere have attracted little attention in 
the literature. However, a cursory review of semi-annual operating reports 
from PWR plants showed that release to atmosphere varied from a fraction of 
a curie per year up to about 900 Ci/y. The latter release, for the Oconee 
plant in 1974 (Ref. 20), compared with a release in liquid effluents of about 
350 Ci for the year. 
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Overall, it seems likely that tritium releases to atmosphere could 
be 10 to 2Qilb of releases in liquid effluents, and this would have an additional 
radiological impact. The first-pass dose to the population within 103 km of 
aUK site has been estimated to be 10-2 man-rem per curie of tritium 
released (Ref. 21). Assuming a release to atmosphere of about 100 Ci per 
GW(e)-year, the contribution to population dose from this mode of release 
could exceed that from liquid release, but the total would still only be of the 
order of 1 man-rem per GW(e)-year. 
6. 3 Population dose from BWR operation 
The system assumed for the basic BWR gaseous effluent case is a 
30 minute delay of the air-ejector off-gas. No special provision is made 
for the control of radio-iodine. In the augmented case, allowance is made 
for 10 day xenon holdup using a recombiner/charcoal bed, and a clean steam 
supply to the turbine gland seals and to valves of diameter exceeding 2.5 
inches. 
In the basic liquid system, clean liquors are filtered and 
demineralised, allowing 90% recycle. Chemical wastes are evaporated 
prior to discharge, whilst dirty, including laundry, wastes are filtered. In 
the augmented system, additional tanks are provided so that essentially 
complete recycling of clean wastes is achieved. The chemical and dirty 
wastes are evaporated, the former being partially recycled. 
A summary of the estimates of population total-body and thyroid 
doses, normalised to 1 GW( e) -year of operation, is shown in Table 7. This 
shows that almost all of the dose from BWR operation is due to noble gas 
release and that substantial reduction is achieved by the introduction of 
charcoal bed systems. The thyroid dose from radio-iodine release is also 
reduced significantly by augmentation of the waste system. The total-body 
dose from liquid releases is quite small even for the basic 
treatment system. 
6. 4 Globally dispersed activity 
In addition to the so-called first-pass doses discussed above, 
further contributions can arise from the widespread dispersal of some long-
lived environmentally persistent nuclides. The significance of H-3 and 
Kr-85 in this respect has long been appreciated but only recently has the 
much greater importance of C-14 been recognised (Ref. 21 , 22 and 23). The 
radiological impact of releases of these nuclides is summarised in Table 8. 
Estimates of the population dose factors, in man-rem per curie, vary 
considerably in the literature, being dependent on the assumed modes of 
T 
-
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release, the realism of dispersion models and dosimetric models, and the 
assumed future growth of population. The release rates assumed for H-3 
and Kr-85 are those for the basic treatment cases considered in 6. 2 and 
6. 3. In the case of tritium, it has again been assumed that 10% of the release 
is to atmosphere. 
Estimates of the total production of C-14 in LWRs have ranged from 
about 15 to 50 Ci/GW(e)-year and, with the assumption of a release of about 
one third from the reactor, a figure of 10 Ci/GW( e)-year seems reasonable 
for the present purpose. 
Table 8 illustrates the importance of carbon-14 as a source of 
population exposure. 
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7. PLANT WATER RECYCLE IN PWR PLANTS 
The recycle of primary water of suitable quality in LWR plants is 
clearly a sensible and economic mode of operation. Where there is deliberate 
drainage of systems, the collection of the water in such a way as to maintain 
its purity and avoid aeration enables its re-use, thus reducing the load on 
the waste processing system. To this extent , recycle has been practised in 
all LWR plants. 
In more recent years, considerable attention has been given to the 
design of PWRs and to operational procedures to permit more complete 
recycling of plant water. The main reason for this is reported to be the 
control of tritium release (Ref. 24). Thus, as tritium cannot easily be 
removed from water, it was apparently reasoned that, by recycling plant 
water, the tritium would accumulate in the plant rather than be discharged. 
In practice, some loss of plant water is unavoidable and since, with recycle, 
the specific activity of the water increases over the plant life, it is of 
interest to know by how much the tritium release is reduced in the long-
term. Another factor is that, with a high degree of recycle, the increased 
specific activity of tritium can result in significant levels of tritium in air 
in and around the plant, so contributing to the radiation exposure of plant 
personnel. 
In this section the effects of primary water recycle in PWR plants on 
occupational and population exposures are examined. 
7. 1 Tritium production in PWR plants 
The modes of tritium production in PWR plants include fission and 
neutron capture reactions on deuterium, boron and lithium. The total 
production and the expected releases to coolant from the various sources are 
summarised in Table 9 (Ref. 25). The lo/o release of fission product tritium 
is based on experience with !.ircaloy clad fuel. The total tritium release to 
coolant is 690 Ci/y except in the initial (first-year) cycle, in which there is 
an additional contribution of 520 Ci from burnable poison rods. Both of these 
values have been normalised to 1 GW (e). 
7. 2 The accumulation and release of tritium 
During the operating cycle of a PWR, there is an increase in the 
level of tritium in the coolant, which is taken to mean the contents of the 
reactor system, the recycle holdup tank and the reactor makeup water 
storage tank. During refuelling , the coolant is mixed with the contents of 
the refuelling water storage tanks (RWST) and, to some extent, with the 
spent fuel pit ( SFP) water. 
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In Ref. 14 it was estimated that complete retention of plant water 
would cause the tritium level to rise to about 4. 5 ~Ci/ml after 32 years of 
operation of a 1300 MW(t) PWR. In practice, some loss of water is 
unavoidable and an analysis has been made of the effects on accumulations and 
releases of tritium of different assumptions as to the leakage rates. The 
model assumed and the principal parameters are shown in Fig. 2. 
If I0 is the tritium inventory in the coolant at the beginning of the 
nth cycle, the inventory I; at the end of the operating cycle will be 
I '-- r r- -(A+/..t)-' -(A+f.J.) n (>.. + fJ.) L 1 - e · j + In e 
it being assumed that the cycle period is one year. 
The tritium leakage from the coolant system during this period 
L is 
1 ,n 
L. 
l,n 
rp ,- 1( r )( 1 -(A+f.J.))' 
= (>.. + f.J.) L 1 +; In- (>.. + f.J.) - e J 
At the end of the operating cycle the inventory In' is mixed with J/, the joint 
inventory of RWST and SFP, and a fractional leakage m of the total inventory 
occurs during the refuelling operation. The total tritium release for yearn 
is therefore 
At the end of refuelling, the refuelling water is returned to storage 
and the initial inventories for year ( n + 1 ) are 
J { n + 1 ) 
where K 
= 0; + Jn' ) ( 1 - m) K 
= 0; + J/ ) ( 1 - m) ( 1 - K) 
volume of coolant 
total volume 
Four cases have been evaluated, one representing the idealised 
case of Ref. 14, that is complete recycle, and three representing a range of 
more practical situations. In the latter three cases, the fractional loss, m, 
during refuelling has been assumed to be 0. 02. In Ref. 25 the design estimate 
of non-recycleable leakage was 20 gallons per day. Operational experience 
suggests that this is rather low and a value of about 48 gallons per day 
(corresponding to fJ. = 0.137 y-1) has been used to illustrate the realistic 
maximum-recycle case. The other cases evaluated are fJ. = 1, corresponding 
to 350 gallons/d, and fJ. = 3. The latter case would be representative of a 
situation in which recycle was being deliberately minimised. 
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7. 3 Assessment of occupational dose 
No direct measurements of tritium dose to PWR plant personnel have 
been reported, but attempts have been made to estimate the relationship 
between the tritium concentration in coolant and in the containment 
atmosphere. A series of measurements at the H.B. Robinson plant over a 
five-month period in 1974 (Ref. 15) gave average concentrations of tritium 
in reactor coolant of 0. 222 j.LCi/ml and, in the containment atmosphere, 
3.84 pCi/ml, though the results were rather variable. Accepting this as the 
only estimate available, a coolant concentration of tritium of 1 J.Ci/ml will 
give 17 pCi/ml in the containment atmosphere. Assuming a breathing rate 
of 1. 25 m 3 /h, and a dose commitment of w-4 rem per curie intake of 
tritium, it can be deduced that 1 ).lCi/ml in coolant results in 2 x 10-3rem 
per hour of containment access. 
During the refuelling, with the containment ventilated, the relation-
ship between the water and air concentrations may be different. The average 
temperature, and therefore the average water vapour pressure, in the 
containment will be lower during refuelling. However this factor must be 
set against the effects of exposing a large area of water, the surface layer of 
which is relatively hot. It has, therefore, been assumed that the same 
factors can be applied to containment access during refuelling, as during 
periods of operation. 
The amount of containment access required is liable to variation 
but, in Ref. 15, it was estimated that the annual requirements were 750 man-
hours during plant operation and 10,000 man-hours during the annual shut-
down. These values have been used, in conjunction with the dosimetric data 
discussed above, to estimate the impact of plant recycle on occupational 
exposure. 
7. 4 Assessment of population dose 
The impact of plant water recycle on population dose depends on 
the mode of release and the site location. It has been assumed that all 
tritium released during the operating phase is in liquid effluents but that 
during refuelling outages half of the release is to atmosphere, via the 
containment ventilation system. The resulting population dose has been 
calculated for a site location on a European river, using a value of 1 x 10-2 
man-rem per curie of tritium released either to the river or to atmosphere, 
as discussed in section 6. 2. 
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7. 5 The radiological impact of plant water recycle 
The effects of plant water recycle in PWR plants are summarised in 
Table 10. The results show that, as compared to a low-recycle case, the 
idealised complete recycle of plant water would increase the average tritium 
concentration in plant water by an order of magnitude. In the case of a more 
realistic maximum-recycle case, the factor of increase is five. The 
occupational dose resulting from recycle, although subject to considerable 
uncertainty, does appear to be significant. 
Under the particular assumptions used in this study, the 
population dose from tritium release is comparable to the in-plant dose 
from the nuclide for a plant operated in a low-recycle mode. Increasing 
the degree of recycle does result in some reduction of population dose but 
this is more than off-set by the increase in occupational dose. For site 
locations other than rivers, the population dose from tritium release is 
lower and so the benefit accrued from increased recycle would be even less. 
In some cases, such as a coastal site, for which the population dose from 
the release of tritium in liquid effluents is very low, recycle could actually 
increase the dose since a higher proportion of the release would be to 
atmosphere. 
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8. THE OPTIMISATION OF RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION 
8. 1 Occupational exposure 
The review in section 4 of this report showed that occupational 
exposure is posing an increasingly severe problem in the operation and 
maintenance of LWR plants. Occupational exposure to date, in the US , has 
averaged about 1400 man-rem per GW(e )-year of electricity generated. This 
is liable to increase substantially as plants age. Possible developments to 
alleviate the occupational exposure problem include measures to control 
corrosion product behaviour, chemical decontamination of reactor systems 
and the general optimisation of plant layout and design. The first of these 
methods represents the ideal solution, since reduced activation of corrosion 
products would reduce both occupational exposure and the burden on waste 
management systems. In practice, the scope for corrosion product control 
in normal plant operation by manipulation of coolant chemistry is very 
limited, particularly in the PWR, because of the use of chemical shim. 
However, a technique involving the chemical and thermal cycling of the 
coolant during plant shutdown has been used successfully in Canada (Ref. 26). 
Reactor system decontamination by the addition of proprietary chemical 
reagents, basically ammonia citrate/oxalate, has also been performed 
successfully in the UK (Ref. 27). The disadvantage of chemical cleaning is 
that the large volumes of chemical wastes may pose a disposal problem. 
The imposition of more stringent limits on releases of radio-
activity does not appear, necessarily, to increase occupational dose. In 
many cases, improved system design would be effective in reducing both 
categories of exposure. In a few cases, most notably that of tritium, it does 
appear that attempts to reduce releases might significantly increase 
occupational exposure. 
8. 2 Population exposure 
The review in section 6 showed that there have been two main 
contributions to population exposure from the operation of LWR plants. One 
of these, the population dose from gaseous releases from early BWR plants 
operating on the least favourable sites, has been reduced from about 3000 
to less than 100 man-rem per GW(e )-year. The other major contribution is 
from the release of carbon-14. This is a problem which has only recently 
become apparent and its absolute significance is still a subject of discussion. 
It seems unlikely that any measures which might prove necessary for the 
control of carbon-14 releases would pose significant problems in the control 
of occupational exposure. 
A part from this question of C-14, it is clear that the level of 
collective population exposure from plants with augmented waste systems is 
far, typically two orders of magnitude, below the level of collective 
occupational exposure. 
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8. 3 Maintaining exposure 'as low as reasonably achievable' 
The need to maintain radiation dose 'as low as reasonably 
achievable' applies to both occupational and population exposure. However, 
it is only relatively recently that any attempt has been made to apply the 
principle formally to occupational exposure, (e.g. Ref. 28 to 30). The stage 
does not seem to have been reached at which the numerical techniques of 
cost-benefit analysis can be usefully applied. A great deal can be 
achieved without any obvious cost penalty by placing more emphasis on the 
occupational dose aspect during the design stages. An important aspect of 
this is the feedback of information from operating plants to assist in the 
analysis of access requirements to different parts of the plant, to enable 
unsatisfactory or unreliable equipment to be identified, and to enable the 
design of plant to be generally optimised. 
8. 4 Cost-benefit analysis 
Attempts have been made to apply the method of differential cost-
benefit analysis to maintaining population dose as low as reasonably achievable 
(Ref. 16 and 17). Even in these cases, the technique appears to have been 
used mainly retrospectively in attempts to justify decisions already taken. 
Some form of cost-benefit analysis seems to be the only possible 
approach in optimising the balance between occupational and population 
exposure. Thus in evaluating the cost of features aimed at reducing one 
category of exposure, account should be taken of any possible increase in the 
other category. However, in judging the relative worths of the two types of 
exposure, three points must be borne in mind: 
i ) the levels of occupational exposure are real and measurable 
whereas , in many cases , population exposure is hypothetical 
and is often based on grossly pessimistic models, 
ii) levels of occupational exposure are, for a significant fraction of 
plant personnel, quite close to the individual dose limits, 
whilst those to individual members of the population are orders 
of magnitude below the limits, and 
iii) occupational exposure imposes a direct cost on the operation of 
the plant since, for some tasks, it dictates the level of manning. 
Estimates of the monetary equivalent of population exposure, at levels to 
individuals of a few per cent of natural background or less, have ranged from 
about $10 to $1000 per man-rem. Among the factors which have contributed to 
the breadth of this range are the use of discOunting procedures by some 
workers but not by others, and the inclusion or not of a contribution from the 
genetic effects of radiation. In general, the more sophisticated estimates 
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have tended to be at the lower end of the range, and a value exceeding $loo 
per man-rem seems difficult to justify. 
ICRP 22 suggested that doses close to the limit could be 
discouraged by arbitrarily increasing the monetary equivalent of one man-
rem by a factor of ten or so. Applying this factor of ten would yield a value 
of $1000 per man-rem for occupational exposure. However, the real cost 
to a utility, of reduced productivity and increased manning could be 
substantially higher than this. Estimates of $5000 to $10000 per man-rem of 
occupational exposures have been reported on this basis. Thus, in balancing 
occupational and population exposure , the application of a weighting factor 
of between ten and one hundred to the monetary equivalent of occupational 
exposure can be justified on economic grounds. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
The level of occupational dose in LWR plants is posing an 
increasing problem. A review of plant operating experience in the US 
indicates that occupational exposure averages about 1400 man-rem per 
GW(e)-year of electricity generated. About 10% of this exposure arises 
from the operation and maintenance of waste management systems. The 
augmentation of waste systems to meet more stringent release limits will, 
in some cases, marginally increase exposure whilst in other cases 
improvements in the system could reduce exposure. 
Estimates have been made of the population exposure due to 
releases of radioactivity from LWR plants equipped with basic and 
augmented waste systems. Apart from the global population dose from 
carbon-14 release, the main contribution to population exposure from early 
plant arose from noble gas releases from BWR plants. With the introduction 
of augmented gas treatment systems, these have been greatly reduced and, 
again excepting C-14, the level of collective population exposure has been 
reduced far below the collective occupational exposure. However, it should 
be noted that the estimates of population dose have been based mainly on US 
data and apply to typical US sites. For typical European sites the population 
dose from a given release could be rather higher, reflecting the increased 
population density and the greater utilisation of river water. 
An assessment has been made of the likely occupational and 
population exposure to tritium and their dependence on the extent to which 
plant water is recycled. It is concluded that recycle of plant water results 
in significantly increased occupational exposure whilst only marginally 
reducing population exposure. 
The evaluation of the cost of features aimed at reducing either 
occupational or population exposure must take account of any possible 
increase in the other. This will involve some form of cost-benefit analysis 
which will need to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, taking account 
of the design of a particular plant and its site characteristics. It is 
suggested that the direct monetary cost to a utility of unit occupational 
exposure is one to two orders of magnitude higher than the hypothetical 
cost often associated with population exposure. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE IN LWR PLANTS IN US 1969-1974 
Average collective occupational dose 
Calender 
Man-rem per unit year 
Year BWR PWR All LWR Cumulative 
all LWR 
1969 195 (3) 165 (4) 178 ( 7) 178 ( 7) 
1970 130 ( 5) 599 ( 5) 365 (10) 288 (17) 
1971 255 (7) 340 ( 6) 294 ( 13) 291 (30) 
1972 286 (10) 463 ( 8) 364 (18) 318 (48) 
1973 330 (14) 772 (12) 534 (26) 400 (74) 
1974 507 (14) 364(18) 427 (32) 404 (106) 
Weighted 332 (53) 475 (53) 404(106) 
-average 
(From Ref. 8) 
Note: Numbers in brackets are the numbers of unit 
years over which the value is averaged 

TABLE 2 
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE IN LWR PLANTS, NORMALISED TO ELECTRICAL 
POWER GENERATION 
Average collective occupational dose 
Calender Man-rem per GW( e) -year 
Year BWR PWR All LWR Cumulative 
all LWR 
1969 3300 700 1100 1100 
1970 600 2400 1600 1400 
1971 1400 1100 1200 1300 
1972 800 1400 1100 1200 
1973 1000 2100 1600 1400 
1974 1800 1000 1300 1400 
Weighted 1400 1400 1400 
-average 
(From Ref. 8) 
Note: Palisades PWR plant excluded from PWR data. 

TABLE 3 
LWR STATIONS RANKED IN ORDER OF 
INCREASING NORMALISED OCCUPATIONAL DOSE 
Plant Electricity Plant Dose 
capacity generated age man-rem per 
Plant and type MW(e) MW (e) -years years GW(e)-year 
Prairie Is. 1, P 530 182 1 100 
Zion I, P 1050 588 1 200 
Turkey Pt. 3 & 4, P 1490 1532 2 300 
Quad Cities 1 & 2, B 1618 2168 2 400 
San Onofre 1 , P 450 2042 6 460 
Monticello, B 545 1331 3 500 
Vermont Yankee, B 514 526 2 600 
Maine Yankee, P 790 841 2 650 
Surrey 1 & 2 , P 1646 1547 2 700 
Oconee 1, P 886 724 1 700 
Point Beach 1 & 2, P 994 2250 4 900 
Nine Ml. Pt., B 610 1752 5 1000 
Pilgrim, B 655 718 2 1000 
Conn Yankee , P 575 2650 7* 1000 
Robinson, P 707 1909 4 1100 
Oyster Creek, B 650 2237 5 1400 
Dresden 1, 2, 3, B 1818 3986 14* 1500 
Yankee Rowe , P 175 790 13* 1700 
Ginna, P 490 1551 5 2200 
M ill stone Pt. , B 690 1469 3 2500 
Big Rock Pt., B 72 266 11* 4800 
Humboldt Bay, B 65 266 11* 5700 
Lacrosse, B 50 125 6 5900 
Indian Point 1 & 2, P 1138 1080 12* 8600 
Palisades, P 821 514 3 32000 
* Last 6 years used (From Ref. 8) 

TABLE 4 
BREAKDOWN OF EXPOSURE BY WORK CATEGORY 
Average% of exposure in work category 
Work category From NESP report ( 1) From Refs. 5 & 1_.: 
BWR PWR PWR (2) 
Liquid waste treatment 5.6 4.1 0.5 
Solid waste handling 3.3 2.5 2.9 
Gaseous waste systems 2.7 0.4 3.0 
Head removal and installation 1.4 6.5 17 
Fuel handling 5.5 3.6 3.0 
Fuel pool 0.5 0.3 0.2 
In-service inspection 4.9 5.6 2.0 
Instrumentation 3.0 1.3 1.1 
Control rod drive work 3.2 low 0.5 
Recirc. pumps, cleanup system 7.8 
- -
Turbine and aux. equipment 2.7 
- -
Condensate demineraliser 1.2 
- -
Steam generator work 
-
27 23 
Reactor coolant pumps 
-
2.8 5.9 
Main coolant loops 
-
5.1 3.2 
Charging pumps 
-
1. 4 0.2 
Valves 5.2 4.1 0.8 
Health physics and cleanup (3) 
- -
9.3 
Routine operations and maintenance 33 19 25 
Miscellaneous (4) 20 16.3 2.4 
~: 1. Figures from NESP report are averages of up to 14 plant years 
2. These figures are for one year at H.B. Robinson PWR plant 
3. This item not included in NESP report. Probably comes partly 
under specific categories and partly in routine work 
4. Includes unaccounted-for exposure 

TABLE 5 
RECORDED ANNUAL TOTAL-BODY EXPOSURES FOR 1974 
AT H.B. ROBINSON PWR PLANT 
(Derived from semi-annual operating report No. 9 July-Dec. 1974 Ref. 5) 
1. Radiation exposure by increments 
Annual dose range, mrem No. of individuals in each range 
No measurable exposure 
Measurable exposure below 0.1 
0. 1 - o. 25 
0.25-0.5 
o. 5 - o. 75 
0.75-1.0 
1.0-2.0 
2.0-3.0 
3.0-4.0 
4.0-5.0 
> 5.0 
586 
354 
82 
57 
49 
46 
151 
89 
18 
5 
3 
2. Numbers of individuals exceeding 0. 5 rem in year, by duty function 
Duty function No. of indi victuals > 0. 5 rem 
Routine plant surveillance 
Routine plant maintenance 
Special maintenance: a) Steam generator 
b) Other 
Routine refuelling operations 
Special refuelling operations 
Decontamination and cleaning 
Health physics 
92 
82 
83 
25 
12 
0 
38 
28 
3. Numbers of individuals exceeding 2.5 rem in year, by duty function 
Duty function No. of individuals > 2. 5 rem 
Refuelling maintenance and routine duties 
Steam generator maintenance 
Fuelling operations and inspection 
Health physics coverage 
Janitorial services 
Waste drumming and shipping 
4. Internal exposure 
29 
6 
4 
8 
9 
1 
One person experienced an intake of Co-58 and Co-60 corresponding to 
a dose commitment to lung of 16 rem. 
5. Estimated total man-rem exposure 
The total exposure in 1974 is estimated from the data in item 1 to be 
680 man-rem, of which 512 man-rem arose during the refuelling outage. 

Release Population dose, man-rem/GW(e)-y:ear 
Ci per Total-body Thyroid, from I-131 
GW(e}-y Seacoast River Lake Seacoast River Lake 
PWR- basic 
Gaseous 
Noble gas 3 104 1 10 0.8 
- - -
I-131 1.0 
- - -
30 200 20 
Liquid 
H-3 750 0.005 0.5 0.08 
- - -
Non-tritium * 50 6 110 3 
- - -
I-131 16 
- - -
60 400 80 
Total 7 120 4 90 600 100 
PWR - augmented 
Gaseous 
Noble gas 8 103 0.25 2.4 0.2 
- - -
I-131 0.11 
- - -
4 22 2.3 
Liquid 
H-3 500 0.003 0.3 0.05 
- - -
Non-tritium * 0.40 0.0013 0.013 0.0012 
- - -
I-131 0.07 
- - -
0.26 1.6 0.4 
Total 0.25 2.7 0.25 4.3 24 2.7 
*Includes radwwd1nes (Denved from Ref. 17 & 18) 
TABLE 6 
POPULATION TOTAL-BODY AND THYROID DOSES PER GW(e)-YEAR 
FROM BASIC AND AUGMENTED PWR ON TYPICAL US SITES 

Release Population dose, man-rem/GW( e )....year 
Ci per Total-body Thyroid from 1-131 
GW(e)-y Seacoast River Lake Seacoast River Lake 
BWR- basic 
Gaseous 
Noble gas 3 106 640 3000 330 
- - -
1-131 2 
- - -
70 400 40 
Liquid 
H-3 120 0.001 0.08 0.013 
- - -
Other * 80 3 25 0.8 - - -
1-131 4 
- - -
14 84 20 
Total 640 3000 330 84 480 60 
BWR - augmented 
Gaseous 
Noble gas 105 12 80 8 
- - -
1-131 0.044 
- - -
0.03 6 0.6 
Liquid 
H-3 80 0.0006 0.05 0.008 
- - -
Other * 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.003 - - -
1-131 0.16 
- - -
0.6 3.8 0.88 
Total 12 80 8 0.63 9.8 1.5 
* Includes radioiodmes (Derived from Ref. 17 & 18) 
TABLE 7 
POPULATION TOTAL-BODY AND THYROID DOSES PER GW(e)-YEAR 
FROM BASIC AND AUGMENTED BWR ON TYPICAL US SITES 

Quantity Units H-3 C-14 Kr-85 
Half-life years 12.3 5730 10.6 
Population dose factor man-rem/Ci 5 10-
4 
300 10-4 
BWR 
--
Typical release rate Ci/GW"( e) -year 120 ,.., 10 500 
Population dose commitment man-rem/GW( e) -year 6 10-2 3000 5 10-2 
PWR 
--
Typical release rate Ci/GW( e) -year 750 ,.., 10 1000 
Population dose commitment man-rem/GW( e) -year 0.4 3000 0.1 
Note These estimates do not include the first-pass dose (Ref. 21) 
TABLE 8 
POPULATION DOSE FROM THE GLOBAL DISPERSION OF RELEASES OF H-3, C-14 
AND Kr-85 FROM LWR PLANTS 

TABLE 9 
TRITIUM PRODUCTION AND RELEASE TO COOLANT IN PWR 
Total Expected release 
production to coolant 
Tritium source Ci per Ci per 
GW( e) -year GW( e) -year 
Fission 11500 115 (1) 
Burnable poison rods 660 520 
(initial cycle only) 
Soluble boron 550 550 
Lithium-6 15 15 
Lithium-7 10 10 
Deuterium 2 2 
Total: Initial cycle 12700 1210 
Total: Equilibrium cycle 12100 690 
(Derived from Ref. 25) 
Note: 1. Assuming zircaloy clad fuel 

Average concentration 
Average release rate Radiological impact 
of H-3 in water 
Case J.ICilml Ci/GW(e)-year man-rem/GW( e)-year 
Operation Refuelling Operation Refuelling Occupational Population 
Low recycle case 0.38 0.29 610 19 6 6 p. = 3.0, m = 0.02 
Typical recycle case 
0.92 0.69 460 44 15 5 J.l = 1.0, m,; 0.02 
Maximum recycle case 2.0 1.5 140 97 30 2 iJ. = 0.137, m = 0.02 
Idealised recycle case 3.0 2.5 
-
50 
-P.=O,m=O -
Notes: 1. Averages are over a 30-year reactor life. 
2. Population dose estimates are for a location on the Rhine and are based on 10-2 man-rem 
per Ci of tritium, both for river and atmospheric releases (see section 6.2). 
TABLE 10 
SUMMARY OF THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT DEGREES OF WATER RECYCLE IN PWR PLANTS 

2011 1100 
MEASURING POINT 1 
150 1100 
mrem/h mrem/h 
100 
400 
50 2011 
L------J~--~-J----~~---~-~-~---._~19~7~1~ 0 0 -- - 1967 1969 1967 
FIGURE 1 BUILD UP OF DOSE RATE IN VICINITY OF PRIMARY SYSTEM OF THE KRB PLANT (Ref. H) 

I 
H-3 release r--------. 1 
to coolant Coolant - - ~ - - RWST + SFP 
I mixed J 
" 5 annu91ly 6 
r Ci/y 4.8 10 kg -- -<--- 2.5 x 10 kg 
FIGURE 2 
decay 
A ' 
leakage decay 
,11 IJ. A ' 
SIMPLIFIED MODEL TO ILLUSTRATE EFFECTS 
OF PLANT WATER RECYCLE IN PWR 



